The Hinge

The Indian Ocean subsystem of the thirteenth century was composed of three adjacent zones, divided principally for geographic regions. These three zones could be delineated for their differences in culture, with the Western zone falling under the realm of Islam, the Eastern region under Buddhism, and the Central zone under Hinduism. These separate cultures, however, intermixed, and were not as much a determinate of the boundaries as were geographical and meteorological factors. The foremost influence on these boundaries was the varying monsoon seasons and the accompanying winds. With travel primarily by sea at that time, wind was obviously an extremely relevant factor. Because of the cyclical changes in wind, certain parts of the voyage could only be completed within limited time ranges. In this way, the Indian Ocean subsystem was divided into three parts, resulting in “two interchange points that remained relatively constant: the south Indian coast…and the Strait of Malacca.” The southern coast of India served as a “hinge,” in other words, a natural divider in the seaways that connected the Middle East and China. Because of its location, South India was a major component of the world trade system.

Both the western (Malabar) and eastern (Coromandel) coasts of India, despite differences in climate, culture, and social organization, were engaged in world trade for thousands of years before Christ. Malabar served as a link westward to the Middle East and into the Mediterranean while Coromandel was the link to Southeast Asia. Beginning around 1200, trade from the western coast of India diversified to include “true bulk commodities” in addition to the luxury goods trade it had been facilitating for centuries. This increase and change in demand was created by the growth of Mediterranean trade and the appearance of Muslim states in North India to further the link with the West. Because of these deep connections between India and the Arabs from the West, an Arab-Indian hegemony formed in the Western Indian Ocean, ended only when Chinese withdrawal left the Indian Ocean vulnerable to new domination, an opportunity taken advantage of by the Portuguese.

The chapter revealed a couple of intriguing aspects of the Indian involvement in the world system. Trade in the Indian Ocean was consistently peaceful, despite the “existence of at least four sea powers sharing…the continuous sea expanse.” This stability was in stark contrast to the persistent naval warfare that was taking place concurrently in the Mediterranean. On a related note, merchants did not depend on military convoys as Italian merchants did. Rather, ships in the Indian subsystem traveled together “for mutual assistance and because propitious sailing times were so strictly limited by the monsoon winds on which all depended.” As mentioned above, the Portuguese were able to take over control of the Indian Ocean by force in large part because the existing players were unprepared to deal with such power. Additionally, with south India’s strategic geographical position as the hinge of the Indian Ocean, it is a valid assumption that the Indian subcontinent was hegemonic. While south India did include many valuable ports at which most if not all traders stopped, it did not develop itself as a dominant sea power. The book does provide a few explanations. Self sufficiency left India indifferent to many of the goods traded in the rest of the world market. India was much more a supplier than a buyer, as India already had abundant wealth, raw materials, agriculture, and industry. Also, India’s geographic location left if vulnerable to incursions by the Muslims from the west and Chinese from the east, as increases in their sea power led to a decreased focus on sea trade on India’s part.

While these are recognizable factors that contributed to the prevention of the establishment of India as a major world power, it is still questionable as to why India didn’t rise to further dominance. Her ports were of absolute necessity, as technology at the time did not allow ships to sail the open ocean. They instead hugged the coastline, increasing the value of these already geographically central Indian ports. Furthermore, demand for Indian goods, both necessary and luxurious, was very high, leading one to believe that India was in a position to massively increase wealth, power, and control over the flow of trade. Why, then, in the emerging capital system of the time, did India refuse to take full advantage of their position of power? Why was India satisfied while many other world players looked to increase their influence? It seems that India’s actions go against the natural human desire to increase wealth. One possible reason is that the costs of increasing prices, taxes, etc were too much in comparison to the benefits. As mentioned in class and in the book several times, merchants had to stop in India. There was no feasible alternative. A potential alternative, however, is war, as it is very possible in my opinion that India feared that excessive taxes and prices would drive visiting merchants to the war path because they had no alternative. Rather than give up trade between west and east, merchants would be likely to fight against suppressive Indian control. Additionally, the book does not make enough of the fragmentation of India itself as a factor in its inability to establish its dominance. Without unification, the country as a whole was not focused on consolidating its position of power as a whole but was rather instead concentrated on maintaining the power of individual states. Many local rulers received hefty financial benefits and may not have been willing to risk these profits to improve the country’s standing as a whole. If anyone else has additional reasons on this discussion, I would appreciate hearing them.

How Can the Weather NOT Affect Trade?

The Ancient Greeks told the story of Icarus, a young man whose father, Daedalus, made them both wings made out of feathers and wax so they could escape their exile on the island of Crete. As they set out to fly away, Daedalus warned his son not to fly too close to the sun or the sea. Sadly, as we all well know, Icarus had so much fun flying high that he ignored his father's warning and flew so close to the sun that its heat melted the wax in his wings and the feathers came off and he fell and died.

This is probably one of the most accurate, concise summaries of mankind's history than you could ever ask for. Man has long thought that he was smart enough to overcome the forces of nature, that he had brains, tools, and technology on his side and was therefore the smartest, most powerful force on this planet. Time and time again, he has been proved wrong. Who here remembers a little thunderstorm called Katrina?

We've all seen the movie Titanic, and no doubt remember how dramatically director James Cameron emphasized the selfish J. Bruce Ismay, managing director of the steamship company, and how he ordered Captain Edward John Smith to turn on all the engines so he could show off how fast his fancy new ship could go when they made a new world record by arriving in New York ahead of schedule: and how the captain said this wasn't a good idea because they were in a part of the ocean that was FULL OF ICEBERGS making it a VERY BAD IDEA TO GO FAST. We all know how that turned out.

And of course, we have plowed forward and become the global society that we are today by laughing in the face of Nature's dangers. Would we even be here on America if our ancestors had not seen fit to brave the dangers of a sea voyage in search of a better life on another continent? But for all those that made it to America, an equal number died on the trip and never got to see the sunny beaches of New Jersey.

I wrecked my first car because I was driving in a snowstorm. The weatherman told me conditions were icy and dangerous and to be careful driving, and my mom begged me not to drive to this party at my friend's house in the mountains because of the icy mountain roads, but I laughed at her, the weatherman, and Nature, assuring them all I would surely be fine. I had technology, or, a '97 Buick LeSabre (don't hate! I inherited it from my grandma and it ran smoooth as butter. until I wrecked it.) Sure enough, there I was going 45 mph around a curve at the foot of the mountain while trying to change the radio station, and I hit a patch of ice and slid smack into a telephone pole. Totalled. Mother Nature: 1, Me: 0.

There's a famous TV commercial that shows coal factories spewing smoke and a polluted river full of trash and then a close-up of the face of a noble-looking Native American shedding a single noble-looking tear for how badly we palefaces ruined their sacred land. The truth of the matter is, the Native Americans fucked the land up as much as they could before we even got here with their crazy corn crops and teepee building and whatnot.* Without tearing Nature apart for food and shelter and fuel, we'd probably be dead. I mean face, it, we are on the top of the food chain.

*also the actor playing the Native American was actually Italian.

Still, it seems like a happy medium is something we could all shoot for. It can't be denied that we need to tear this planet apart for fossil fuels and trees and soil and crops, and that we needed to cross oceans to find better fossil fuels and trees and and soil and crops (find, buy, or steal from the natives, that is). But with each new jump forward in technological advances in the history of human-kind, it seems like we get that much more careless about noticing what the weather report is like, and how dangerous a thunderstorm can actually be. Maybe a little humility and respect for this planet that gave birth to us in the first protein strings and amino acids that formed in the tidal pools at the Dawn of Time. Maybe check the weather report, and bring an umbrella if they say it might rain. Just sayin'.

Katie Dempsey

The "Hinge"

Abu-Lugbod discusses everything from the importance of the all important Persian Gulf and the slave trade to my primary focus, India. India for centuries will serve as a prime location for trade. The Indian Ocean is sub-divided into three culturally different regions. India consists not as a unified state but as culturally abundant zones. The Indian Ocean served as a connection “on the way to everywhere”, as state by Abu-Lugbod. Thus my question is why did India not unify and continue to lead as a hegemonic force is the “Modern World System”? One main reason is the reclusion of Chinese, opening the door to Portuguese, as later mentioned.
India not unified, seemed to have a lack of interest in becoming a hegemonic force, in the World System. It being the gate way that linked the Mediterranean region and Middle East with China virtually everyone passed through. Also, do not forget about the fragmentation the of the Mongol Empire and the major land passage that closed with it. India’s lack of interest is contributed to by its location. It was in the prime of the pre-world system being known as the “hinge”. Thus, India has no need to create a unification of state to trade, as it is already a key point along any trade route. Location is not the only reason for its relaxed approach to the world system.
A second reason is the Chola State (5th-13th A.D.) developing advanced agrarian, mercantile, and industrial society. There advancements soon spread to the fragmented parts of India. There advanced society produced more than it consumed, yielding a high export rate. In essence their economy was self-sufficient in a way that they depend less than any other force did on the pre World System. The next question that arises is why did India not unify under one state. The first reason was mentioned before their self sufficient society, made no need of such a unification. Secondly, legitimate king-ships could not influentially reach out to connect all regions of India. With no such unifications India could stop the Portuguese invasion of the Indian Sea.
The last reason they didn’t unify and become the hegemonic power is because of the Portuguese invasion. China at the time held the leading naval Power in the Indian Ocean, and with the reclusion of the Chinese navy, it let the door open for a new force. Thus, Portuguese entered the scene with their Man-O-Wars. India being wealthy due to prime location was uninterested in building a navy to control trade was now subject to Portuguese jurisdiction with heavily taxed trading permits. This eventually led to the downfall of India and the emergence of a new European focused World System. India goes from being a prime trade center in the pre world system to a secondary trading empire in the Modern World.
I again ask why India did not unify and become the hegemonic force in the evolving World System. Mentioned before was India was too wealthy. Its non – reliance on the pre-world system led it to be a passive force instead of uniting and aggressively asserting its could be role. Secondly, India was known as the “hinge” literally almost all trading routes passed through here as it connected the pre world system. India had an abundance of goods to export as well, so it’s a natural trading Mecca for other purchasing merchants, basically showing that world economy depended more on their exports than imports. The last reason mentioned was the Chinese withdrawlment of their naval power. This opened the door to the “Pirates”, Portuguese who imposed the world system to work in its favor. This is why India did not become a unified hegemonic power in the New World System.


Eric Wisniewski

Blog 3

This week’s reading explained the trading routes between the Persian Gulf, Read Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. Sinbad’s “middle way” through the Persian Gulf and Baghdad was the cheapest and easiest route to take until it experienced blockages because of the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia and the demotion of Baghdad from Islam. Baghdad was central for world trade and extremely prosperous during the 10^th century. However, during the 11^th-12^th century, Baghdad encountered many misfortunes, mostly natural disasters, that led to its decline. With the decline of the Persian Gulf, Egypt gained exclusive control over the sea to India and China. In addition, the rise of Islam in the 7^th century created a unity with the Arabs, Egyptians, and Persians that dissolved the rivalry between the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The effects of the Black Plague weakened Egypt’s economy significantly and when the Portuguese decided to block the Red Sea to Muslims, India became the major source of wealth.  I thought it was interesting when Abu-Lughod was describing the relations between Islam and business. I think she could have expanded on this relationship more because I am not quite sure I understand the connection or how Islam worked well with the principles of business? 

Muslim/Christian Trade

This weeks readings of the book, Before European Hegemony talked about trade through the middle route. The violence of the crusades or the Papal injunction did not stop the trade from prospering between the two. The Musilm merchants and the christian merchants had actually developed a relationship over the years. The trade between the middle rout was a major contributor to the prosperity of the chief port for the crusader colonies, Acre. Acre was controlled by the venetian colony. The Venetians seemed blind to the fact that their priveleges were about to come to an end. Mamluk sultan had reign over the remained peaceful in the latin states of Syia. However, needing replacements for his troops, another treaty with the Genoese was carried out. It guaranteed safety of each countries merchants, but by that time the trade across the inland route had declined immensely. The truce ended in 1921 when Qalawun's son, the successor, drove the crusaders from their last port in Acre. The Venetians and Genoese had to find ways to gain access to the silks and spices of the far east. One alternative was to use the northern overland route and another was to work through the II-Khans of Persia who allowed European merchants to pass through their territory. The most daring alternative was to circumnavigate Africa by means of the Atlantic and gain sea access to the Indian ocean. Two brothers, Ugolino and Vadino tried this third alternative but they were never heard from again. THe trade continued through the second alternative. Europeans had to deal with muslims inhabiting their territory. The only "free" passage was through II-Khan territories to Hormuz on the Persian Gulf. Then they could set sail to India. I thought it was interesting that neither the crusades nor the Papal injunctions diminished trade between the inner route to some degree. It seemed as though people viewed the Papal injunctions as something informal. Although it prohibited Europeans to trade with muslims as well as one being in place between the European traders with the "infidels", it didnt seem to stop people from breaking it.
I was wondering if there were any other alternatives that the Genoese and Venetians did not think of that they could of utilized at the time?

Concluding the World System During the Thirteenth Century

Abu-Lughod depicts the significance of yet another trade route between Europe and the Far East, which is through Sinbad and the Persian Gulf. It became essential when problems arose in either Constantinople or Egypt through means of the Red Sea, although the Red Sea clearly led to a more difficult journey. Baghdad faced a noteworthy fall to the Mongol Empire, but it’s not necessarily certain whether or not it rose again like Samarkand. Baghdad’s trade with Syria and Egypt did not continue again until the fourteenth century, yet the centrality of location ensured that the Gulf would be used even in the worst of times. Egypt on the other hand was a vanguard to the world system by the thirteenth century with an essential location, but European Crusaders and Central Asian Mongols certainly weakened the country. Once again of course, the Black Death debilitated an already weakened economy, leaving only India as an outside source of wealth.

Abu-Lughod then finishes with the explanation of trade in Asia through Part III of Before European Hegemony, which explains the coasts of India, the power of the Strait area, China influenced by different dynasties through time, and the collapse of the sea route. It is surprising how passive of a role south India played after the thirteenth century, due to its strategic location, and that it was because of its wealth and self sufficiency. Also, it’s easier to understand the importance of the Straits and the surrounding regions with abundant resources because when demand was high natural products were redefined as exports and the labor was available. Singapore and Hong Kong gained their success through the idea of a “free” port and access to an otherwise restricted market, and small kingdoms along the passage never really became naval powers.

I think this book does a good job of describing that the thirteenth-century system of international trade was indeed substantially more complex organization, volume, and execution than anything before. It seems practically irrelevant to compare it to our system now as far as size and certainly technology when Abu-Lughod analyzes the development and innovation at a global level during the thirteenth century. She finishes with “A Theory of Systematic Change” and “Future World Systems,” and I would ask why this is essential to her conclusion. She even mentions the United States and its military attempts met with declining success, but I think it was important that she reiterated the purpose in her work because there is so much we can learn from the thirteenth-century world system.

Reflections on the Revolution in Pittsburgh, Or,

Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds

I stumbled into a “protest” today near the Schenely Park bridge. There was an okay-sized crowd, but there was an even better looking police force, almost like a Roman phalanx. I made my way to the front lines of the crowd to take some pictures. The crowd—led at point by a couple of anarchists or something—was slowly inching forward towards the phalanx, then two clouds of smoke erupted and the crowd flew like a flock of penguins away from the front line.

Some thoughts about the sociology and psychology of the crowd: It seemed to me like today’s protest (the one on the bridge near Schenley Park) was homogeneous in the sense that it was almost all college students who just wanted to look at and take pictures of the police, maybe make a few ironic jokes about the anarchists (chanting: “Out of the streets, into the showers”), and maybe wanted to see some action. It seemed like the people there were just playing the role of crowd, without actually giving any thought to anything related to the G-20. Today’s crowd also seemed to exhibit some signs of hysteria and madness, which could be seen when it approached the armed phalanx, and especially when it ran from smoke and horses.

My theory is that people have a picture in their minds about what a crowd should look like, and what a crowd should do. This is entirely due to the media and what we see when we look at history. When we form a crowd and someone curses globalization, we will curse globalization too ,unless we are in a tea party, then we would curse Obama and health care. But the two sides are in a sense the same, humans are after all very communicative and pack animals.

What are people protesting anyway?: It seems like some people are protesting CEOs, some are protesting globalization, some are doing countries they don’t like, others advocating animal rights (!), but most people seem to be protesting “stuff.” I find anarchists the funniest.

Some thoughts about anarchism: Anarchists protest government, or at least big (which can mean relatively small) government. There are also many different types of anarchists. Ayn Rand wrote that an ideal society would have no taxes, have a laissez-faire economy, and members of society would pay out of pocket for services like schools and police. Imagine paying for police services individually. Rand thinks (thought) it’s human nature that the rich would be able to pay for police protection, while the poor would not. Other anarchists just don’t like government. What seems ironic to me is that when anarchists riot, they get a taste of anarchism.

The G-20 is still going on tomorrow. In the mean time: Workers of the world…!

-Stefan Larson
(this post is for extra credit)

The Rise of the West

Clearly the rise of the west had something to do with its timing. The East and Middle (East) in the 13th-15-th centuries had various problems that contributed to their relative decline in that world system. The route along the north had become too dangerous and unpredictable to remain a viable ‘core’ region. Fighting between the Mongols and the Muslim population in and around Iraq lead to the destruction of Baghdad, the first hegemonic trading centre. An important lesson for Europeans was that when trade routes in one area become less profitable then you must find alternatives. Egypt and the city of Cairo benefited from this situation when it’s route became the most widely used. Also, European powers (namely Venice) benefited from renewed trade through Cairo. Europe by this time in history was a growing partner in the world system.

On the other side of the Middle East, the numerous powers around India and S.E. Asia claimed trading preeminence. Their cities lay on the coasts that would connect Western traders with the East. It was access to these ports in the Far East that would necessitate naval technological advancements for Western powers. The native peoples of this region failed to realize the importance of this fact. The saying is that “necessity is the mother of all invention.” This is a good way to illustrate how and why Western European powers places so much emphasis on naval technology. The routes through the Middle East became too perilous for European traders to profit from and alternative routes to the East became important again. The maritime superiority of European nations (traders) allowed the Portuguese, Dutch and English to eventually control this region of S. Asia. It wouldn’t be until centuries later that China would be dominated by the West and this too had a lot to do with Superior English seamanship.

The most interesting aspect of this time period is the rising importance of the navy which is one main reason why Western powers began to dominate the world system instead of simply being a partner to it. Is there another single factor that helped transform the old system into what could be called the infancy of our contemporary system ?

Blog 3

This week we read about the trading system between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia with a focus on the three major trade routes (the Northeast Passage, the Persian Gulf route, and the route through the Red Sea).

I found the chapter on China’s fleeting chance at world hegemony most interesting.  With its impressive technological advances, its great population, natural resources, and strategic locations, it is surprising that China did not become a world power for any extended period of time.  Abu-Lughod gives a few reasons, and seems to come to the conclusion that China’s economic collapse, not unaffected by the rest of the world’s economic crises, was the final blow. 

Not to be ignored, Abu-Lughod mentions that China’s withdrawal was somewhat caused by Confucian virtue.  Unlike other countries, the wealthy merchant class in China was looked down upon, for Confucian ethic demeaned commercial gain, and had no access to government power.  This class could not sway the government in their favor as other trading classes could, and did.  With the Ming dynasty, and the rebellion against Mongolian forces, Confucianism was brought to the forefront of the government again.  To distance themselves from their Mongol predecessors, the Ming wished to demonstrate their moral example.

With the Black Death, and then the great economic crisis in the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming were forced to switch from offensive to defensive rule.  No longer could they sustain their impressive fleet, and continue to trade aggressively with the outside world.  The last blow was the silk route across Central Asia was cut off after the Mongol empire fell, and as the world trade system started failing, China’s southern sea route was useless.

China was forced to withdrawal from the world system and concentrate on rebuilding the agrarian base.  This caused an end to two hundred years of naval dominance, and China’s chance at world hegemony.

Like many of the other blogs, I too am interested in the weather’s affect on trade.  Is it really that important?

--Arielle Parris

Blog Entry 3

The Indian subcontinent was indispensible in its contribution to trade in the world system. India served as a natural link connecting sea routes between the Mediterranean region and the Middle East with China. South India can be traced back as a sea trade hub some 4000 years. Trade with Rome primarily established the link between India and Europe. Rome desired many Indian goods including exotic animals, spices, cloth and Ivory. The Romans desired much more from India then they had to give back. As a result, Rome traded vast amounts of metal coins to India. South Eastern traders established trade routes in India sating back to the 1^st millennia BC.

I found it interesting how India played a somewhat passive role in trade given its location. India is in a perfect location to achieve hegemony. If it capitalized on its location I believe India could have become more powerful. One of the reasons they didn’t capitalize on the opportunity is because India is a self-sufficient civilization. India did not need goods as much as other countries desired theirs. As a result, they could never maintain hegemony.

This weeks reading made me wonder exactly how important India was to the world system. Without India would the world system advance as much as it did in the 13^th century? If India hadn’t taken such a passive role in trading with Europe and Asia would Europe still become achieve hegemony.

Sean McNamara

Blog Three

The Middle East is the connector between Europe and “Far East”. It is an important factor in global trade because it made the Chinese and Persians be able to trade with each other therefore drawing a connection between the East and the West and enhancing trade. Yet the Middle East seemed to spend more time fixing conflict, likes the Muslims and the Crusaders, within their own empire than trying to reach out to others.

Geographically, trading in the Persian Gulf was perfect. It connected India, The Middle east and the Mediterranean sea. If a successful trade system were just based on location, this place would have been at the top for eternity. Unfortunately the success of trade in the Persian gulf stumbled because there was constant struggle over who controlled and fighting made the trade routes less safe and there was no organization. Also, when the alliance between Persia and Iraq crumbled it had a seriously negative effect of trade. Egypt’s success in trade ended for good when the Portuguese took control of the Persian Gulf trade after the Black Death struck.

The Muslims in the Middle East always struggled with the crusaders from Europe. Even the authorities discouraged trade with Europe. I find it incredible that the importance of their religions so greatly outweighed their want for money and trade that they would sacrifice a profitable trade route just because of their beliefs.

-Dorothy Smith "Bunny"

Is Violence Really Necessary during the G-20?

For extra credit, I decided to blog about the ridiculous acts of the G-20 and how Pittsburgh is getting out of control.

Today was an extremely important day for the G-20. The start of the G-20 was taking place, and the city was buzzing with students who wanted to see some famous world leaders. However, many newcomers arrived in the city, not to check out the streets, but to violently protest against the G-20. Some protestors, the Free Tibet protestors, started their protest this morning in front of Soldiers and Sailors. They were demonstrating a peaceful protest and respecting the city. However, when I entered the streets around 6:30, there was a protest taking place that started to turn for the worse. Down by Phipps Conservatory, a massive group gathered, mostly students just wanting to check out all the buzz, along with a protesting group in the middle of the street. I do not want to sound rude when I describe them, and I am extremely sorry if I offend anyone, but the protestors were dressed in mostly black, with unbrushed hair, and bandanas wrapped around their faces and heads. The police established a "go no further line," about 15 police deep and all across the street. They had shields, guns, and police on horses. The police officers made it clear that they do not want to use force on the protestors but when a few men started screaming "what can they do to us? Let's keep moving forward," the police started shooting off tear gas which sent everyone running. When the tear gas cleared, everyone went back and now, the protestors started throwing things. I was there solely to watch, and I did not understand what everyone was so upset about because their signs were not giving any info. Some of the protestors were just anarchists who wanted to be heard, and others were protesting the CEOs. When I asked a woman why she was protesting, all she said was the CEOs. She could not tell me anything past that which made me wonder if she knew what the G-20 was at all. She proceeded to ask me if I was educated and if I had a job because Obama and the rest of the world leaders were not acting in my favor. My favor? They haven't made any decisions yet! This woman told me she had a masters degree when I asked if she was educated because clearly she had no background in what the G-20 actually is. She rudely informed me that I would only be benefitted if I was a CEO and even then it would not really help. She was an animal rights protestor. And while animal rights is something that i agree with, that has absolutely nothing to do with the G-20. The G-20 is a summit where the world leaders discuss economic problems, not regular political problems like animal rights. Being caught up in these unnecessary riots is just plain stupid. There have already been 15 arrests, broken windows, etc all for no reason. If these protestors really want their point across, why destroy peoples homes and try to fight the police (who, keep in mind, can arrest you and also carry guns)? The G-20 was supposed to benefit Pittsburgh, but it is just destroying the city with people who don't exactly know what they are here for.

Baghdad

The easiest route through the Persian Gulf was the middle way. This middle way continued through Baghdad. Many blockages occurd during this century because the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia and the demotion of Baghdad from Islam. Traders needed to move north so they could have a better trade. Europeans now traveled through the Central Asia. Baghdad was key because the most heavily populated traveling area was the crosspoint to Baghdad. Key routes ran through Baghdad and Baghdad was considered one of the most prosperous towns in the world. Baghdad had an extremely active economy which heightened by the export trade (Baghdad had relatively good trade). Eventually, Baghdad declined due to politica, economic, and social reasons. The city was eventually reduced to provincial capital, but was still considered as a source for revenue. Economic decline of Baghdad was evident because long distance trade routes bypassed Baghdad. When the Mongols suffered from agricultural productivity, Baghdad suffered from famine. Baghdad started to decline in population and became more deserted.

I found it very interesting when the book mentioned how much of a powerhouse Egypt was. I never thought of Egypt as being so influential. When I read that Egypt was allowing trade but no travel to foreigners through their land, I found that interesting. The Middle East wanted the Europeans for trade, but they hated them because of the wars. The Middle was dependent upon a trading system that they did not even like which seemed puzzling to me.

The Indian Subcontinent: Hinge, but not hegemonic.

The Indian Ocean was divided into three major interlocking units in the thirteenth century mainly for geographic reasons coordinating with the monsoon cycles. These included: 1) the western-most circuit dominated by Muslims, 2) the center Hindu circuit, and 3) the Chinese circuit of Buddhists and Confucianists. While several “locally hegemonic powers” coexisted, there was no single power dominating the whole system. The monsoon wind patterns had such fatal potential for any would-be traders that manuals were created to guide them across the treacherous waters. Interestingly, directions for Arabs included how to get just about anywhere within the first two circuits, but not how to reach any of the Chinese ports. This is because Chinese ports weren’t welcoming any foreign traders by the late 1300s – a key point in explaining the demise of the old system and opportunity for the construction the Euro-centered system to come.

Contrary to traditional thought and my former impressions, Southeast Asia was hardly of passive, primitive peoples who were instructed by the more advanced Indians or Chinese; rather, it it was Southeast Asia who developed refined metallurgy and agricultural advancements first and likely influenced India and China through their traders as early as 1000 B.C. The nature of trading communities along the Indian coast were unified governing bodies, but rather more like an “archipelago of towns” that had more in common with the communities they traded with across the ocean than they did with eachother.

Appropriately, Abu-Lughod describes India as the “hinge” for cultural diffusion and economic exchange between all peoples to the east and west of sub-continent. Both the peoples of Malabar coast and of the Coromandel coasts, though the regions were very different in ecology and social organization, were involved in primitive world economies before the middle ages: Malabar with the Middle East and Coromandel with Southeast Asia thousands of years before Christ. After 1200 there was a significant change for Indian trade along the western coast. Trading and carrying capacity had improved greatly so that in addition to luxury goods, bulk commodities became important to meet basic needs, including even live horses and bulk foods. Why? Mediterranean trade was expanding and powerful Muslim states in northern India were emerging and reinforcing trade with the Mediterranean. When Gujarat was absorbed by the Sultanate of Delhi, it was reinfused with luxury goods to support the elite despite counterforces of the Mongols’ conquest of Persia and Iraq by the mid-thirteenth century. Between them, the Arabs and the Indians (perhaps most so in Malabar) shared hegemonic rule over the western Indian Ocean throughout the medieval period.

Unlike in the Mediterranean, commerce in the Indian Ocean was never characterized by naval warfare, because it wasn’t necessary. The trade was generally peaceful and before the Portuguese arrival in 1498, there had been no attempt by any political power to dominate the circuits. Merchants didn’t depend on convoys like the Italians did; ships traveled together for mutual assistance and because times for good travel were so limited due to the monsoon winds that everyone depended on. The Portuguese gained power with the originality of its practices. Its way of trading – according to a complex system of compulsion – was entirely new.

Even though India could have easily dominated the world trade system, it did not. Abu-Lughod credits this to India's absorption of trade surpluses. It produced itself many of the of or products and goods in demand in the world market, while it imported very little: "Ironically, wealth rather than poverty seemed to keep her from playing a more aggressive role in the thirteenth-century world system, a system driven more by need than satiety" (285). As the Arabs to the west pushed east and the Chinese to the right pushed west, trade at the center declined, leaving the Indian zone displaced and vulnerable. When the Chinese then withdrew , the zone was free to be exploited by the Portuguese.

Abu-Lughod describes the coexistence of several locally hegemonic powers as being the “natural condition of the Indian Ocean.” This is very interesting and also not entirely clear to me. In what way was it this natural for the region and why?

Before European Hegemony Commentary #3

This week’s reading focused on the ever-expanding trading system between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. More specifically, Abu-Lughod detailed the importance, yet instability, of the three major trade routes; the Northeast Passage, Sinbad’s middle route through the Persian Gulf, and the southern route through the Red Sea. All three of these routes fluctuated in significance as a result of many factors.
During the 10th century, Baghdad was still largely considered a central part of world trade, moreover the center of the earth. They used the middle route for trade, through the Persian Gulf, because of the simplistic transit between Asia. The 11th and 12th centuries brought misfortune for Baghdad. There was famine, many serious fires, religious conflicts, destructive floods, and subsequent chaos in the city. This deteriorated the cities wealth and power, leaving only a prominent name in history. Prosperity was lacking, but Baghdad remained part of the trading network. By the end of the 13th century, Mongol’s added to Baghdad’s diminishing economy by averting European trade northward and taking over their city.
Islam took over, unifying Arab, Egyptian, and Persian ideologies; furthermore, this integrated the utilization of both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. By the 14th century, however, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea became rivals again. Both routes always had a constant flow of trade. The cause of the fluctuation of value within the trade system relied more on the quantity of trade flow.
Abu-Lughod described three reasons for this constant fluctuation of route significance. The first was that the Persian Gulf had a lack of unified control. This encouraged traders to use another route to prevent risks. Secondly, when Persia and Iraq unified, trade through the Gulf was re-encouraged. The third factor related to economic health around the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, both the Persian Gulf route and the Red Sea route were rivals. This led the demise of Baghdad and the rise of Egypt.
The one question that stuck out of me the entire time I was reading was whether Baghdad was completely destroyed or did it redeem itself in later centuries. This would depend on one’s definition of success. Baghdad was no long a world hegemony but had a persistent role within the world trade system.

Weather

I think the question that arose about weather during the times of trading of the thirteenth century is very interesting. It is obvious that weather plays a very important role in the trading systems. Since a lot of trade was done over seas, weather needed to be perfect for the trading to occur. Many students brought up the fact that many major natural disasters occured that may have broken ports or ships and deterred the traders from being able to receive and distribute goods, but during the time even a slight weather pattern could interrupt traders from sailing the seas to other countries. A simple storm on the sea could possibly set traders back days and even damage cargo, ships and sometimes be deadly.
Another reason why weather was an important factor for trading was because those who were taking their trip by land were also held back during times that weather was dangerous for travel.
Another interesting fact that was brought up during class was that weather was important for crops, which is an essential part of trade. If it rained too much the crops could be ruined and if it didn't rain at all, no crops would be growing for the traders.
We still weather as an important factor in our society today. Many natural disasters (such as Katrina) damage many businesses, causing them to lose their profits and goods; setting them back thousands of dollars and countless hours of work. Also, the same issues in the thirteenth century still hold true to fisherman today. Weather can keep fisherman from receiving the type of crop they are used to, and they put their lives in danger by setting out to complete their jobs in treacherous rains and storms.
It's interesting to think that something so important (but not quite focused on) is something that no one can control. While, technology and building supplies have been advanced since the thirteenth century, allowing ships to be more stable and tough enough to handle bad weather, there is still no way that we can stop weather from occuring or natural disasters from ruining people's lives.

Trade between the Middle East and India

This week’s reading focused on the trade of the Middle East between the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf during the 13th and 14th century. There was a time that all areas traded together without competition, but then the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf became competitive. The Persian Gulf was used more for a while because of the calmer seas and more trade and goods were moved through there. The Persian Gulf then lost its standing because of conflict and economic problems, which allowed the Red Sea trade to grow. The Persian Gulf was a lower on the trading pole than the Red Sea. This allowed Egypt to rise and become hegemony at that time. Egypt’s stand in the trade eventually faded leading to the rise of India. India in the world trade system was more export than import. India had everything to sustain itself and most trade was brought to them. Since India exported more than imported proved how industrialized they were.
I found it interesting how large the Middle East and Egypt were in the world trade system during the 13th and 14th century, because the Middle East, especially, is consumed with war today. It is very hard to picture all roads leading to Baghdad.
One question in class was interesting was how weather could affect trade. Thinking about the amount of trade, during the 13th and 14th century especially, used maritime would definitely be effected by weather. The Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf all surround the Middle East and were all used for trade. If there are high winds or storms over those waters it will slow down the trade between countries. In the book the Red Sea is talked about being extremely rough, so getting trade through that area is rough and you have a lot of lives in danger. If there is ever an extreme weather like there was during Katrina hurricane in present time than you the economy is surely going to be devastated.

Towards a Unified Theory of Extra Credit Point

‘Rise and Fall’

The title of this blog post is pretty much a joke. It alludes to the problem that many historians face when looking at the history of the global economic system during 1250-1450 CE (the period that Abu-Lughod is writing about), that being: what caused the economic system to fall, and what caused the Europeans to emerge as global powers. More closely, we can ask: what was the cause of China’s decline in power?

Abu-Lughod’s final chapters thoroughly explain that (I) the eastern parts of the world (the “orient”) were in no way separated from the, and passive concerning, the global economic system, and (II) that the “rise and fall” of the global economic system was not due to any psychological, technological, or industrial factors, and that the term “rise and fall” is not representative of the true history.

In Chapter 10 of Before European Hegemony, Abu-Lughod highlights many areas where China was particularly advanced at the time. She also juxtaposes these advancements with Europe at the time, and it can be inferred that China was almost an hegemonic nation. Areas such as shipbuilding, technology (navigational, killing-related items, etc.), economics, and more, were areas in which China could be called hegemonic, or at least a world-leader (i.e. hegemonic?).

But what caused China’s “fall”? What caused Europe’s “rise”? These are questions and terms, Abu-Lughod says, that need to be crossed out of our historical vocabulary concerning the late-medieval economic world system. Instead, writes Abu-Lughod, the “fall” of China and the world system, and the ensuing “rise” of the European powers should be closely examined, and once this is done it will follow that we will realize that it was no simple rise and fall but something else.

The something else was caused by the Black Death, the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire, the geopolitical changes in the Chinese system, and many more reasons. Abu-Lughod argues, “If we assume that restructuring, rather than substitution, is what happens when world systems succeed one another… then failure cannot refer to the parts themselves but only to the declining efficacy and functioning of the ways in which they were formerly connected.” I interpret this as saying that no one thing or nation caused any rising or falling; I think a unified theory of why Europe emerged as a global power was due to the law of gravity or a specter of change that caused the decay of the economic world system.

Blog 3: Why fight a good thing?

In this weeks reading, Janet Abu-Lughod discusses the importance of location in the world system. We learn from this novel, from Abu-Lughod continuous reinforcement, that strategic location alone cannot ensure permanent hegemony. Although, strategic location does present the opportunity for permanent hegemony. First, she introduces Egypt as the central link between the Middle Seas and the Green Seas. Egypt’s ability to protect and nurture that link from Europe led to its critical importance to the economy. When it was unable to maintain this link after the 15th century--due to the threat of European crusaders, Central Asian Mongols, and the Black Death—rising core players swiftly replaced Egypt.
Second, South Chinese Sea was also crucial. The world system divided the South Chinese Sea into three interlocking circuits: 1) westernmost circuit consisted of Muslim ship owners and major merchants, 2) middle circuit, and 3) easternmost circuit considered the Chinese “space” sea.
Lastly, the Indian subcontinent literally and figuratively thrust India into the world market. Literally, the geography of the subcontinent is such that the southern tip protrudes into the Great Sea created a “natural link and divider of the great sea route”. Gradually, India became the center of commerce. India was a significant player in production with numerous goods such as textiles, spices, and other luxury items. India was self-sufficient and indifferent to many of the “heavily-traded commodities”.
Janet Abu-Lughod states that if location was enough, India should have “enjoyed unrivaled dominance in the world system”. Everyone was bringing goods to their market. Everyone was buying Indian goods. Why were they unwilling or unable to strike forth and take it? Is it every that simple?
No, even if India had displayed tremendous effort in securing its position as hegemonic power, it would never have lasted. Hegemony is futile. It is frail, and forever changing, because the playing field is forever changing.
The market system for the Fairs of Champagne is fourth cousins twice removed in the family of the world market compared to the trade that developed in India. Compared to today, Champagne Fairs are the adopted child of the cousin I knew once. The field is constantly evolving into something novel. The newly contemporary market leads to new developments in trade in order to deal with the new field, which in turn leads to yet another new field.
In a world where society is continuously changing whether it is rapid or sluggish, can we ever go back? How can we develop the perfect system if the situation it is designed to fill is constantly revolutionizing? Can we use the mistakes and feats of the past, when they are crucial to the players and irrelevant to the present situation?

BEH: Commentary 3

This week's readings take us from the European segments of the world system to the Middle Eastern (i.e. Persian) and the Far Eastern (i.e. India and China) sections. The Persian subsystem was largely characterized by the two waters it had and used: the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. While for some time the Persian Gulf was clearly the more favored route, due to it having various land access points, a sea trail that hugged the coast and a smaller land route, later with a shift in subsystem dynamics the Red Sea (although not intrinsically better) became the dominant - and actually the only - viable trade route in the area. This was indeed a major change as the Persian/Middle Eastern subsystem was responsible for getting goods from the Far East to Europe and visa versa. The effects of the change are seen through the dynamics of Venetian and Genoese rivalries and its outcomes.

The farther Eastern subsystems were most undoubtedly marked with the unique characteristic of not only not having a supreme hegemon, but also having a distinct and influential weather system - the monsoons. Because of the immenseness of the Indian Ocean, there were three and not just one subsystem that worked the area. It is interesting to note that although in the book (and in modern context) India is spoken of as one entity, it was actually quite fragmented. It is important to realize the two coasts of India - the East and West - were even part of essentially different subsystems. In marked contrast to the European traders and city-states, the people in India did not try to become hegemons or regulate or tax the trade that was GAURANTEED to stop at their ports. This passivity has been characterized as a result of India's comparable wealth. China also has a unique history distinct from that seen in Europe. It should be noted that China was far more advanced than other parts of the World System although historians have often attributed the ascension of Europe as a hegemon to its particular Scientific Revolution. Early on China was a great trading, sea and political power. They were on a campaign to show their glory to the entire world and to gain "international" fame and status. However, later due to largly internaal problems, they became comparably isolationist.

Abu-Lughod returns to her goal of her novel as she discusses the ascension of Europe to the world hegemon. She repeatedly highlights on the fact that the European rise was not because they "felled" the East, but rather the East was already falling before the European's rose. I find that the passivity for the Chinese and Indians (East) - although beneficial in the short term - was not ready for the European "plundering" and aggressiveness. The relative peace and disorganization in the East allowed the West to impose its own rules on trading which obviously benefited themselves.

I found it interesting to find the dynamics of the Persian subsystem and how it was kind of like a see-saw in regards to the dual nature of the sea bodies - the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. I have read about how important water accessibility is, but I never realized how things like being able to hug the coast and having strategically placed ports and the shape of landmasses could affect the efficiency and profitability of trade.

One thing I am unsure about is the deal with the Portuguese. Were European traders not going directly to the Far East before the Portuguese circumvented Africa? If they were, what did they not have that the Portuguese did that stopped the others from doing what the Portuguese later did? Up until we talk about the shift in power globally, the Portuguese were never even mentioned?

-Ragini Grace Gupta

Scramble for Dominance

The trade route through the Persian Gulf had to first run through Strait of Hormuz before reaching the Arabian Sea and continuing through the middle route to Asia. Here, a number of principalities and smaller cities took advantage of their location and began to impose their influence on merchant vessels. These people either imposed a toll of tribute on merchant vessels trying to pass through to the ports which connected to land routes or captured their own sections of the trade, pushing their status as small city-states to commercial centers along the trade route. Merchants traveling to and from Baghdad, India, and China, along with from the Red Sea route would dock at these centers and exchange goods creating a new market which previously did not exist, helping economy systems of these port cities to prosper.

Something I found interesting was how that even with the dominance of Baghdad declining, commerce between the Gulf region and China remained prosperous. Merchants were still raking in huge fortunes through this route. What spawned from this power shift was the emergence of independent entrepreneurs who competed with each other for control over trade throughout the Gulf, weather it was through legitimate business or piracy. One example is the island of Qais, which practiced both. It began with the use of blockades on major trade passages through the first half of the twelfth century to acquire goods from passing merchants. Then during the Mongol conquest of Persia and Iraq in the late thirteenth century, this port became a key center of trade for the Asian market.


I wonder if the piracy practiced by the people of the island of Qais was so significant in their development into one of the key ports along the middle route. Would their fate have been the same if say they concentrated on becoming a legitimate center from the start?

Before European Hegemony 3

The most effective trade route in the Middle East during the 13th and 14th centuries would have been the middle route. The middle route connected the Far East and Europe through the Persian Gulf as well as other key cities, such as Baghdad. However as obstacles appeared othere routes then became ulitiled, including the Red Sea. At one point in history these two bodies of water were controlled by the same power. Once they broke apart the two waterways became rivals, each wanting to have more trade and goods passing through them. The Persian Gulf initially recieved more trade because of clamer seas and more conviently located ports. All that would begin to change after the Mongols invaded and took over the Islam capital, Baghdad. Baghdad no longer was a glorious city for trade, instead it became a military Mongol controlled city. Another factor contributing to the loss of trade in the Persian Gulf comes from disunification between Iraq and Persia and the fact that the Christians had lost their territory along the Syrian coast. The route also started failing because of the economics involved. Once the economies started weakening so did the traders. Due to hardships befallen to the middle route and the Persian Gulf the Red Sea became a more viable option. Egypt controlled the Red Sea at this point and took full advantage, taxing the traders. Egypt controlled a lot of territory at this point including including most of Syria and they held the gateway between China and India. Europeans however were not allowed to cross through Egypt, although they were allowed to trade in the port cities. Europeans were very strictly monitored becasue they were still infidels. Egypt imported slaves to help protect their terrioties, and wanted a monopoly in trade. Up until the 15th century they held onto their monopoly, so in the long run Egypt and the Red Sea outlasted and had more trade than Iraq and the Persian Gulf.

What I found interesting about the Middle East in this section of the book was how dominant Egypt was for international trade during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. Not knowing much about Middle Eastern history myself, I never realized how much influence Egypt had in the world system. I never realized how much power they wielded when it came to trade. In todays world they are a smaller country, so thinking they had a powerful government and a lot of territory is suprising. I also found it interesting in the way Egypt handled the Europeans regarding their trading abilities. Europeans could come to the port citites along Egypt's borders but were not allowed to travel through Egypt on land. Middle Eastern nations had a complex relationship with the Europeans, needing them for trade purposes, yet not liking them as people because of the Crusade Wars.

I wonder what would have happened had the Arabian Peninsula remained united throughout these centuries. When the Arabian Peninsula was united the Persian Gulf and Red Sea were not competing for trade but instead were both beneficial to the Arabs, Egyptians, and Persians. Had these groups remained together who knows what trade would have looked like during these centuries. Maybe trade would have been the same with heavy taxes and eventual competing between the two bodies of water. Or maybe a few people would have totally dominated international trade. With the middle route becoming extinct and the eventual fall of the northern route, trade by sea was becoming more neccessary. Would these powers have remained a monopoly in trade, and would they still be dominating trade in those regions today.

European and Islamic trade, week 4

The Middle East is very fascinating to me still, due to my lack of exposure to the history. Regardless, it is clear that the Middle East was a crucial component of global. Trade between the Chinese and Persians began early as 671 and linked the West to the East, thus facilitating global trade. The Islamic Empire had many disputes among Muslims from different tribes and power struggles ensued for the entirety of the empire. While fighting occurred within the empire, Muslims also had to fight against foreign threats, like the Mongols and the Crusades.

During the crusades, papal injunction prohibited trade by Europeans with the “infidels” of the Muslim world. Although merchants did not obey this, the loss of Acre as a Crusader colony made the enforcement stricter. After the fall of Baghdad and rise of Cairo as the trading center of the Muslim world, it appears that the Muslim authorities also discouraged trade, through heavy taxes on European merchants and outright ban of European traders in Egypt.

Why would the authorities of both European and Islamic empires discourage trade with one another, especially due to the economic benefits of trade? Obviously, religious and political motives are behind such regulation, but I would assume that the pros would outweigh the cons. If Europeans were not allowed to trade with Muslims, they could not have access to the goods from the East. The Middle East was perhaps attempting to focus on conflicts within their empire, rather then trading with foreign lands; however, still limited the economic profits of trade with the Europeans.

The Foundations of the Nazi Economy

As the National Socialist Party (Nazi Party) rose to power in the early 1930’s, the German economy was in shambles due to the world wide Great Depression. The German unemployment was approximately 30% and the government under Heinrich Bruening had a large budget deficit. Additionally, the German currency was in crisis, as the government ended dependence on the gold standard (“a monetary standard under which the basic unit of currency is defined by a stated quantity of gold”, from Merriem-Webster.com.) The downturn of the German economy directly caused the rise of the Nazis, whose programs for economic development focused on employment through public works, rearmament and military spending.

The introduction of Fascism brought major changes the German economy. First, the free market system was replaced by a system of government intervention. Second, the political democracy, which was the previous system for governmental control of the economy, was replaced by the ruthless dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. And third, labor organizations, such as unions, were abolished. Essentially, Hitler was priming Germany for a wartime economy.

The new economic policies’ effects on the common German citizen were quickly felt, as public works (i.e. the autobahn) and military rearmament employed millions. In fact, the German unemployment rate declined the fastest of any country during the Great Depression. The Nazi Finance Ministry created programs that aimed to make Germany self-sufficient to fight a war, such as programs to construct rubber, steel and textile plants. Under Finance Minister Hermann Goering imports were severely limited, wages and prices were controlled and industrial dividends were restricted. The German people were satisfied with Nazi economic policies, as they had ended the Great Depression, however, these policies actually weakened the German economy’s ability to support the military later on, contributing to the Nazis’ eventual defeat.

Sources:

DeLong, J. Bradford. “Slouching Towards Utopia?: The Economic History of the Twentieth Century. XV. Nazis and Soviets” 1997. University of California at Berkeley. Sept. 21, 2009. http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/Slouch_Purge15.html

Nathan, Otto. The Nazi Economic System: Germany’s Mobilization for War. Duke University Press. 1944.